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This paper builds a new dataset on bank ownership and bank performance 
covering approximately 50,000 observations for 119 countries over the 1995-2002 
period. The paper then uses the dataset to reassess the relationship between bank 
ownership and bank performance, providing separated estimations for developing 
and industrial countries. It is found that, while ownership is strongly correlated 
with performance in developing countries, that ownership is not correlated with 
performance in industrial countries.  In particular, the paper suggests that state-
owned banks operating in developing countries tend to have lower profitability 
and higher costs than their private counterparts, and that the opposite is true for 
foreign-owned banks (which tend to be characterized by higher profitability and 
lower costs).  We also find that, in developing countries, the entry of foreign 
banks plays a useful role by making domestic banks more efficient in terms of 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it describes the construction of a new dataset of 
banking characteristics and performance. Second, it uses this dataset to reassess the relationship 
between bank ownership and bank performance. Third, it tests whether previous findings, which 
indicate that the entry of foreign banks and bank privatization affect the environment in which 
private domestically owned banks operate, are robust to the use of this new dataset and different 
econometric techniques.  
The first part of the paper extends previous work by Barth, Caprio and Levine (1999, 
2001) and La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) in two directions. First, while the 
previous authors focused on a given year (or two years in the case of La Porta, López-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer, 2002), the dataset presented here consists of a panel covering eight years for the 
1995-2002 period. Second, our dataset includes a large number of variables presented at a highly 
disaggregated level. In particular, while the previous dataset focused on bank ownership (public 
versus private, foreign versus domestic) and bank regulation, along with a few measures of bank 
development (net interest margin and concentration), the dataset described here includes a large 
set of measures of bank performance as measured for the whole banking system and for each 
sub-group of banks. In particular, the dataset includes about 50 variables of bank performance, 
each presented using both consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets and then separated by 
type of bank (domestic private, state owned, and foreign owned). 
The second part of the paper extends the vast literature that looks at the relationship 
between bank performance and bank ownership.
1  In this sense the paper is similar to Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2000). These authors, however, focus on an earlier period (1988-1995 versus 
1995-2002), use a smaller number of banks and f ocus only on foreign ownership without 
distinguishing public from private ownership. In estimating how ownership affects performance, 
we follow the approach of Berger et al. (2004) and estimate the static, dynamic, and selection 
                                                 
1 Studies of the relative performance of foreign versus domestic banks in industrial countries include DeYounge and 
Nolle (1996), Berger et al. (2000), and Vander Vennet (1996) and studies focusing on developing countries (or both 
developing and industrial countries) include Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel  
(2004) and Clarke et al. (2000). The research on the relative performance of public banks is more limited; Altunbas, 
Evans and Molyneux, 2001, focus on the cases of Germany and Sapienza, 2004, focuses on Italy). There is, 
however, a large literature on the performance effects of bank privatization; for a survey see Megginson (2004).    6 
 
effects of ownership. However, while Berger et al. (2004) focus on one country (Argentina), we 
expand their analysis to 119 countries for which we have data.   
We find that state-owned banks operating in developing countries tend to have lower 
profitability than comparable private banks and that this lower profitability is due to lower net 
interest margin, higher overhead costs (mostly due to the fact that state-owned banks tend to 
employ relatively more people), and higher non-performing loans.  At the same time, we find 
that foreign banks operating in developing countries tend to be characterized by high levels of 
profitability; this is mostly due to the fact that foreign-owned banks tend to have much lower 
overhead costs.
2 When we focus on industrial countries, we find that, relative to their private 
counterparts, state-owned banks tend to have slightly higher overhead costs but other 
performance variables (profitability, margins, and non-performing loans) do not vary 
significantly across these two groups of banks. We also find that foreign banks operating in 
industrial countries are slightly less profitable than their domestic counterparts and that this 
difference is due to lower margins.  
  Finally, we follow Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and look at how 
changes in bank ownership structure affect the environment in which domestic banks operate. 
Again, we extend their analysis in two directions. First, we use our panel data, which include 
observations for more banks and more countries over a longer time period. Second, rather than 
focusing only on foreign bank entry, we also look at the effect of bank privatization and study 
the importance of state-owned banks.  While we were not able to reproduce the previous result 
that foreign entry reduces profitability, we did find  that, in the case of developing countries, 
foreign entry leads to an increase in efficiency of the domestic banking system. This in turn  
leads to a situation characterized by lower overhead costs and lower interest margins.  
 
2.  The Data 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the main characteristics of the dataset used in this paper 
and the main steps followed in building this dataset. While confidentiality agreements with the 
data provider prevent us from making the bank-level dataset public, we are making public a 
dataset that contains information aggregated by country year and type of banking institution   7 
 
(public, private, foreign). Table A1 in the Appendix presents a detailed list of the variables 
included in the dataset.
3  
  Our main source of data is Bankscope (BSC). Processing the data required two main 
steps: avoiding duplications and coding ownership. For most banks, BSC reports balance-sheet 
data at both the consolidated and unconsolidated levels. However, some banks have only a 
consolidated statement, while others have only an unconsolidated statement. For reasons that are 
discussed in the Appendix, it is impossible to automatically keep the unconsolidated statement, 
for instance, if the consolidated statement is missing.  An even more difficult problem is that in 
some cases BSC reports information for the same bank several times. This is especially the case 
at the time of mergers.  Hence, in order to avoid duplication, we adopted the strategy described 
in the Appendix, which required us to look at one bank at a time and follow banks’ history at the 
time of mergers. 
After eliminating duplications, we end up with a total of 49,804 observations, 
corresponding to a number of banks that ranges between 5,445 (in 1995) and 6,628 (in 2001). 
Banks located in industrial countries represent approximately 70 percent of total observations, 
and banks located in developing countries represent the remaining 30 percent. It is interesting to 
note that the share of banks located in developing countries increased by two percentage points 
between 1995 and 2002.  
Coding ownership also required looking at one bank at a time. Although BSC includes an 
ownership variable measuring whether a given bank is owned by the public sector or by foreign 
investors, this variable has limited coverage, as only about 20 percent of banks are coded for 
ownership. In addition, this variable is only available for the last year for which data are 
available, as BSC does not provide ownership history.  We thus adopted a strategy, described in 
detail in the Appendix, which consisted of coding a minimum number of banks in each country; 
in addition, we coded all banks up to 75 percent of total assets of the banking system in every 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This finding is mainly driven by the sub-sample of foreign banks located in East Asia and Eastern Europe. In the 
case of Latin America, we find that foreign banks have low profitability.  
3 Throughout the paper, we will refer to private banks as banks that are owned by the private sector (they can be 
either privately owned or publicly listed) and to public banks as banks that are owned by the public sector. Hence 
the adjectives public and private do not refer to whether banks are publicly listed or not. In the dataset, we classify 
as public those banks in which the public sector ownership is above 50 percent and classify as foreign banks those 
banks in which foreigners own more than 50 percent of shares. However, in computing country-level foreign and 
public ownership, we follow La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and use the actual fraction of shares 
owned by each shareholder. The dataset is available at http://www.iadb.org/res/files/data_app_mpy.xls   8 
 
country. The strategy further included the use of cut-off points to avoid the time-consuming 
work with information of minimal value.
4   
To validate the data, we check whether the data are consistent with what is found in 
previous sources. Table 1 reports the correlation between ownership and concentration share 
computed using the BSC dataset described above and existing data from La Porta, López-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). The four columns of the table 
present correlations based on consolidated and unconsolidated statements, both including and 
excluding specialized government financial institutions (SGI, which are second-tier banks with a 
specific development mandate). The first row shows that the correlation between the share of 
state-owned banks computed with our dataset and that reported by La Porta, López-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2002) is always higher than 0.85. The second row compares our data on state 
ownership with those reported by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) and shows that the correlation 
is always above 0.76; it is above 0.8 when we exclude SGI. The third row compares our data on 
foreign ownership with those reported by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) and again finds a very 
high correlation (always around 0.7). Finally, the fourth row compares concentration (measured 
as the share of assets of the three largest banks over total bank assets) and finds correlation 
coefficients that are always higher than 0.9. These results are reassuring and indicate that our 
coding is highly correlated with the coding of other studies.  In o rder to make our results 
comparable with previous work, from now on we focus on the sample that does not include 
specialized government institutions.  
Table 2 reports the number of banks included in our dataset (the table includes all banks 
for which we have information on ownership and total assets) divided by region and ownership.
5 
Out of the approximately 50,000 observations for which we have data, 41,800 (84 percent of 
observations) are domestic private banks, 2,000 state-owned banks (4 percent of observations), 
and 6,000 foreign-owned banks (12 percent of observations).  The share (in terms of number of 
observations) of state-owned banks included in the sample decreased from approximately 5 
percent in 1995 to 3.2 percent in 2002. At the same time, the share of foreign banks increased 
from 10.5 percent to 14 percent over the same period.   
                                                 
4 Even with the cut-off points used, coding ownership required two months of work by a full-time research assistant. 
5 The table focuses on median values; average values are extremely similar.   9 
 
South Asia is the region with the largest relative share of state-owned banks (24 percent 
of observations), followed by East Asia (17 percent of observations), and the Middle East (14 
percent of observations). In contrast, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean are 
the regions with the largest number of foreign banks (37, 30, and 27 percent of observations, 
respectively). All other developing regions, with the exception of South Asia, have a relatively 
large number of foreign banks (always well above 10 percent of observations).  
The industrial countries have the largest number of banks in the sample, and Latin 
America the second largest (4,150 observations, corresponding to 8 percent of the total), 
followed by Eastern Europe (3,009 observations, corresponding to 6 percent of the total), East 
Asia (2,252 observations), Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (1,649 and 1,499 
observations, respectively). South  Asia and the Caribbean have the smallest number of 
observations (963 and 436, respectively).  
Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of our sample, dividing the banks by 
geographical region and ownership. The second column shows that public ownership of banks is 
prevalent in Asian countries and Eastern Europe (reaching a peak in South Asia, with 40 percent 
of bank assets owned by the public sector) and much lower in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean 
and industrial countries (with levels of state ownership which hover around 10 percent). Latin 
America and the Middle East and North Africa are in an intermediate position. Foreign 
ownership of banks is particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 46 percent 
of bank assets are foreign owned, and is also prevalent in the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, and Latin America (with foreign ownership ranging between 25 and 32 percent).  
By comparing column 2 of Table 3 with Table 2 it is possible to obtain information on the size of 
banks by ownership. The finding that the share of public (foreign) banks measured as percentage 
of observations is smaller than the corresponding share measured as percentage of total assets 
indicates that the average public (foreign) bank is larger than the average domestic private bank. 
We find that public banks are larger than private domestic banks in every region of the world and 
that foreign banks are larger than domestic private banks in East Asia, the industrial countries, 
Eastern Europe, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  In contrast, foreign banks are smaller than 
domestic private banks in Latin America and the Middle East.  These comparisons, however, 
hide a great deal of heterogeneity within ownership groups. In the case of Latin America, for   10 
 
instance, very large foreign banks (in some countries, like Mexico, the largest banks in the 
country are foreign owned) coexist with small branches of foreign banks.  
 
3.  Ownership and Performance 
 
In this section, we look at whether there is a correlation between bank ownership and bank 
performance. Besides standard indicators of bank profitability like returns on assets (ROA), 
returns on equity (ROE), interest margin, and non-performing loans, we also check whether there 
are correlations between bank ownership and employment and bank ownership and public sector 
lending.  We start by simply comparing medians, and then we test for differences in performance 
with a proper regression set-up. 
 
3.1  A First Look at the Data 
 
Table 3 compares performance measure across  different groups of countries and ownership 
structure. The table reports median values (average values yield identical results).
6  Columns 3 
and 4 of the table focus on two standard profitability indicators: ROA and ROE. They show that, 
in most regions, foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks, both public and private.  
The exceptions are South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, where foreign banks are 
less profitable than domestic banks, and the industrial countries, where foreign banks are less 
profitable than domestic private banks but slightly more profitable than state-owned banks.
7 In 
Latin America, foreign banks and private domestic banks have similar levels of profitability.  In 
all regions of the world, state-owned banks have the lowest profitability. Differences in 
profitability are particularly large in South and East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. 
Even in the industrial countries, public banks are about half as profitable as private banks. 
Columns 5 and 6 look at interest revenues relative to loans plus deposits and relative to 
total assets (this is a broad measure of net interest margin). We do not find any correlation 
between ownership and margins. However, the table suggests that margins tend to be high 
(above 8 percent in the case of column 6) in the Caribbean, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and 
                                                 
6 For this exercise, we compute a weighted average at the country level and then compute the median value for each 
region.    11 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa, intermediate (between 3 and 8 percent) in the Middle East and South Asia, 
and low (below 3 percent) in the industrial countries.  There are two possible interpretations for 
this finding. On the one hand, one may claim that the higher margin is related to a higher 
markup, given that the banking sector is less competitive in developing countries than industrial 
countries. On the other hand, a higher margin may be justified by the fact that banking activity is 
more risky in developing countries. Non-interest revenues (column 7) tend to be lower in public 
banks (Latin America is the exception) and particularly high in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
Column 8 looks at overheads relative to total assets.  This ratio, which can be interpreted 
as a measure of efficiency, does not vary much across ownership types. There are, however, 
large differences across groups of countries. Banks located in industrial countries, the Middle 
East and North Africa and East Asia tend to have fairly low overhead ratios, while banks located 
in Latin America, East Europe, Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa have large overhead ratios. 
Column 9 focuses on employment normalized by total assets; the figures measure the 
number of employed for each US$1,000,000 of total assets.  This can be interpreted as an 
indicator of efficiency and can provide an idea of whether ownership is correlated with labor 
hoarding. In three regions, public banks tend to be characterized by higher employment; at 1.16 
the ratio reaches a peak of 1.16 in the Middle East and North Africa. The opposite is true in the 
industrial countries, the Caribbean and East Asia and the Pacific (where employment ratios in 
public banks are lower than employment ratios in private banks). In South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa we find no correlation between ownership status and employment ratios. We also find that 
in four groups of countries—East Asia and the Pacific, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and the 
Middle East and North Africa—foreign banks have lower employment ratios than their domestic 
counterparts.  One reason why different types of banks may have different levels of employment 
is that they operate in different business areas. For instance, one may think that foreign banks 
tend to be overrepresented in the wholesale market, which is characterized by relatively low 
employment-to-assets ratios, and that public banks mostly operate in the retail market and hence 
tend to have higher levels of employment.  
                                                                                                                                                             
7 It should be pointed out that there may be some problems associated with evaluating profitability of foreign banks 
that, because of the global strategy of the parent bank, may receive subsidies from abroad or try to avoid taxes by 
shifting costs and revenues from one country to another.    12 
 
Column 10 looks at whether ownership affects the composition of deposits. It shows that, 
in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, public banks tend to have a much larger share of 
demand deposits than private and foreign banks. No other clear pattern, however, emerges from 
the data.  
The last three columns focus on non-performing loans and provisions against non- 
performing loans.
8 In most regions non-performing loans tend to be particularly high in public 
banks. This is especially the case in the Caribbean, industrial countries, Middle East, and Sub- 
Saharan Africa.
9 Public banks also tend to have provisions that are slightly higher than those of 
private and foreign banks, but these higher provisions are often not enough to compensate the 
difference in non-performing loans. Consequently, public banks in Asia and the industrial 
countries tend to have particularly high NPL to provisions ratios when compared to other types 
of banks.  
Although interesting, the results discussed above are based on simple comparisons of 
medians. They could therefore prove misleading because they do not capture possible 
correlations between ownership and other factors that may affect bank performance, such as type 
of banking activity and bank size. The objective of the next section is to explicitly control for 
these differences.  
 
3.2  Regression Analysis 
 
So far we have looked at the correlation between ownership and performance by simply 
comparing medians. In this section we formally test for such a correlation by using regression 
analysis. Our basic set-up is the following: 
 
t j i t j i t j i t j i t j t j i X FOR PUB PERF , , , , , , , , , , , ' e g b a h + + + + =      (1) 
 
where  t j i PERF , ,  is a performance indicator for bank  i in country j at time t,  t j, h  is a country-
year fixed effect that controls for all factors that are country-specific (like the level of 
development, geography, institutions, etc) and country-year specific (macroeconomic shocks, 
                                                 
8 The data in these three columns should be interpreted with caution because different legislation allows different 
treatment and leads to different reporting of non-performing loans. 
9 In the case of industrial countries, NPL in public banks are high with respect to NPL in private and foreign banks 
but low with respect to NPL in other regions of the world.   13 
 
political instability, changes in regulations, etc.),  t j i PUB , ,  is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one if in year  t bank  i is state owned (we define ownership using the 50 percent threshold), 
t j i FOR , ,   is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if in year  t bank  i is foreign owned 
(private domestically owned is the excluded dummy), and t j i X , , is a matrix of bank-specific 
controls. The set of controls includes two variables aimed at measuring the main sector of 
activity of the bank and two variables aimed at measuring bank size.  
Non-interest income as a share of total assets tends to be higher for banks that derive 
most of their income from commissions related to services provided to customers. This figure is 
thus likely to differentiate large retail commercial banks from institutions that derive most of 
their income from investment banking activities.  On the other hand, demand deposits as a share 
of total deposits is instead likely to be higher in retail commercial banks than in banks that 
operate mainly in the wholesale market. Following Berger et al. (2004), we also include total 
assets (using the log of lagged total assets) and the bank asset share (which is the share of bank 
i’s assets over total bank assets in country  j , again lagged one period). The former is a measure 
of the absolute size of the bank and the latter is a measure of its relative size, which Berger et al. 
(2004) interpret as a measure of market power.   
While we follow an approach similar to Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), there is a 
fundamental difference between our empirical strategy and theirs. As we are not interested in 
how regulatory and macroeconomic shocks affect bank performance, we control for all these 
possible shocks by including country-year fixed effects.
10 The main advantage of our strategy is 
that we fully control for all types of shocks, thereby eliminating problems related to omitted 
macroeconomic variables and error in the measurement of these variables. The main drawback of 
our strategy is that it does not allow us to say anything about the role of country-specific factors 
(an issue that, at this stage, we are not interested in). 
In all regressions we drop all observations for which we do not have data for ROA, ROE 
and Overhead costs. We also drop all country-years for which we do not have at least five banks. 
To make sure that our results are not driven by the transition from one ownership structure to 
another, we drop all the bank-year observations in which there is a change in ownership (so if 
bank i was public in year 1999 and becomes private in 2000, we drop the observation for 2000).    14 
 
We also exclude outliers by dropping the top and bottom 2 percent of observations for each 
dependent variable. Finally, we recognize that some countries have many more observations than 
others (for instance, the 27 industrial countries included in our sample contain more than 70 
percent of observations, and the 92 developing countries the remaining 30 percent) and that, if 
we do not weight our estimations, our results would end up being driven by the countries for 
which we have a large number of observations. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) 
address this issue by weighting each observation by  t j N , 1 (where  t j N ,  is the number of 
observations in country  j , year  t). We follow a similar strategy but weight each observation by 
the bank’s share of total assets.  This weighting scheme has the same properties as  t j N , 1 because 
the weights add up to one and give each country-year the same weight in the regression. 
However, Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2003) point out that weighting by bank asset share has some 
advantages over the simple  t j N , 1  weighting scheme. In particular, they suggest that estimations 
weighted by asset share better reflect the behavior of the banking industry and point out that if 
measurement errors decrease with bank size, weighting by bank size will produce more precise 
estimates. 
In the empirical analysis we focus on three different characteristics:  (i) profitability and 
interest income; (ii) cost structure, employment and credit allocation; and (iii) provisions and 
non-performing loans. 
 
3.2.1  Profitability and Interest Margin 
 
The basic results on profitability and interest income are reported in Table 4. We have four 
dependent variables, two measuring profitability (ROA and ROE) and two measuring interest 
margin (the first defined as a share of total assets and the second defined as a share of loans plus 
deposits).  In all cases, we run regressions using all available observations and regressions that 
only focus on developing or industrial countries.  
While our main interest is the effect of the ownership variables, we start by briefly 
describing our set of control variables.  The first six columns show that non-interest income is 
not correlated with either ROA or ROE in the full sample or in the sub-sample of developing 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Instead, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) directly control for macroeconomic shocks.   15 
 
countries; instead, non-interest income is positively correlated with these variables only in the 
sub-sample of industrial countries. The opposite is true for the ratio of demand deposits to total 
deposits. Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that retail banks tend to be more 
profitable in developing countries. The findings also suggest that banks that supply many 
services and hence have high non-interest income tend to be more profitable in industrial 
countries. The first three columns further show that there is no correlation between absolute or 
relative bank size and ROA of banks located in developing countries; on the other hand, this 
correlation is negative and statistically significant for banks located in industrial countries.
11  
However, we find that larger banks (in absolute size) tend to have higher ROE in both 
developing and industrial countries.   
Columns 8 and 11 indicate that in developing countries there is no significant correlation 
between net interest margin and non-interest income, but columns 9 and 12 show that the 
correlation is positive and statistically significant in industrial countries.  This positive 
correlation may reflect the fact that banks in industrial countries are shifting their main income 
source from interest margins to fees (Bikker and Haff, 2002).
12  As one may expect, we also find 
that the share of demand deposit is always positively correlated with net interest margin. Finally, 
we find that absolute size is negatively correlated with net interest margin, but relative size is 
positively correlated with net interest margin.  These two results may reflect increasing returns 
and the presence of some market power.  
It is interesting to note that, when we look at the whole sample, we find results that are 
similar to those of developing countries. This is not surprising, because our estimation method 
gives the same weight to each country regardless of how many banks are included in the sample; 
in addition, since our sample includes 92 developing countries and only 27 industrial countries, 
the results for the aggregate sample tend to be similar to those of the developing country sub- 
sample. Hence from now on we will focus on the two sub-samples and will not discuss in detail 
the regressions that include both developing and industrial countries. 
We are now ready to analyze the effect of the ownership variables. The first two columns 
show that, in the sample of developing countries, state-owned banks tend to have returns on 
                                                 
11 These results are robust to dropping the asset share variable. 
12 Foreign banks headquartered in industrial countries might be starting to adopt the same strategy when they operate 
in developing countries, as well as introduce more efficient technology that allows them to charge lower margins.     16 
 
assets that are much lower than comparable domestic privately owned banks. Besides being 
statistically significant, the effect is also quantitatively important, indicating that the average 
state-owned bank has a return on assets which is 0.7 percentage points lower than that of the 
average private domestic bank. Considering that the average value of ROA in developing 
countries (using the same weights used in the regression) is 1.7 percent, this is a sizable 
difference (more than one third of average ROA in developing countries).
13  At the same time, we 
find that in industrial countries there is no statistically significant difference between the ROA of 
public banks and that of similar private banks (at 0.06 the coefficient is small and far from 
statistically significant).  Hence, the difference between profitability of public and private banks, 
which seemed very large in the simple comparison of means of Table 3, becomes much smaller 
and not statistically significant when  one recognizes that public and private banks have very 
different size and tend to operate in different segments of the banking market. This finding 
illustrates the importance of controlling for bank-specific factors in a proper regression set-up.    
These results are interesting because they show that it is not necessarily true that state-
owned banks have lower profitability and confirm the results by Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux 
(2001) who find that, in the case of Germany, there is no evidence that privately-owned banks 
are more efficient than public and mutual banks. At the same time, the results do support the idea 
that in developing countries public banks are less profitable than private banks.  La Porta, López-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) analyze the impact of public banks on growth and find that in 
developing countries the presence of public banks has a detrimental effect on growth; in 
industrial countries, however, there is no correlation between state ownership and growth. They 
argue that this result may be due to the fact that high-income countries are better equipped to 
deal with the distortions that arise from government ownership of banks. It would be possible to 
apply the same line of reasoning and claim that our results are driven by the fact that governance 
issues are less serious in industrial countries (which tend to have better institutions and a better 
public sector), hence public banks in these countries tend to be better managed than public banks 
in developing countries. An alternative interpretation is that in industrial countries public banks 
                                                 
13 By re-running the regressions separately for the five largest developing regions (East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia), we find that state-
owned banks have lower ROA in four of the five regions. The exception is the Middle East and North Africa, where 
the difference is not statistically significant at standard confidence levels.  Full regression results are reported in 
Table A2 of the Appendix.   17 
 
have ceased to play a development role and merely mimic the behavior of private banks, whereas 
in developing countries public banks still play a development role. Public banks’ low 
profitability is due to the fact that, rather than maximizing profits, they respond to a social 
mandate.
14  
Our second result is that, in developing countries, foreign banks tend to be more 
profitable than private domestic banks. Again, the difference is both statistically and 
economically important. In particular, we find that the average foreign bank in a developing 
country has an ROA 0.31 percentage points higher than that of a comparable private domestic 
bank (this is about one quarter of the average ROA in the sub sample of developing countries).   
When we focus on industrial countries, we find no significant difference between domestic and 
foreign banks. Columns 4 to 6 repeat the analysis by substituting ROA with ROE and obtain 
identical results. These results confirm the previous findings that foreign banks tend to be more 
profitable than domestic banks in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000, and 
Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2004) but that this is not the case in industrial countries (Vander 
Vennet, 1996).
15  
It is important to note that the above results are to be interpreted as averages for the 
developing and industrial countries sub-samples, but, as shown in Table 3, the sub-sample of 
developing countries is far from homogeneous. This is especially the case for the performance of 
foreign banks. In particular, Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2003) and Inter-American Development 
Bank (2004) find that foreign-owned banks that operate in Latin America tend to be less (and not 
more) profitable than their domestic counterparts. While these studies use a different dataset 
based on quarterly observations for a group of eight Latin American countries, we obtain similar 
results if we re-run the regressions of columns 2 and 5 separately for each region. In particular, 
we find that foreign-owned banks located in East Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and 
North Africa are much more profitable than their private domestically owned counterparts; the 
opposite, however, is true in Latin America.
16  
                                                 
14 Of course, this interpretation would be in contrast with La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s (2002) finding 
that public banks have a negative effect on growth and financial development. For a discussion of these issues see 
Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2004). 
15 Berger et al. (2000) and DeYoung and Nolle (1996) instead find evidence that foreign banks operating in 
industrial countries are less efficient than domestically owned banks. 
16 Full regression results are available upon request.   18 
 
The last six columns of the table focus on net interest margin.
17 When we measure the 
margin as a share of total assets (columns 7-9), we find that public banks in developing countries 
have slightly lower net interest margins (the coefficient is statistically significant but, at 5 
percent of the developing country average, not very large) and that the coefficient is not 
statistically significant in the sample of industrial countries. When net interest income is 
measured as a share of loans plus deposits (columns 10-12), we find that public banks are never 
significantly different from private banks. These results are driven by the fact that loans 
represent a lower share of total assets for public banks located in developing countries.
18 When 
we focus on foreign banks in developing countries, we find that their net margins are never 
significantly different from those of domestic private banks. In industrial countries, we find that 
net interest margin (in both definitions) of foreign banks is lower than that of domestic private 
banks (the coefficient corresponds to about 10 percent of the industrial country average).  
 
3.2.2  Overhead, Employment, Branches, and Credit to the Public Sector 
 
The first six columns of Table 5 focus on two indicators of efficiency (overhead costs over total 
assets and employment over total assets), Columns 7 to 9 look at the size of the branch network 
and the last three columns focus on credit to the public sector.
19 As before, we start by briefly 
describing the coefficients of the control variables.  We find that non-interest income is 
positively and significantly correlated with overhead and employment but is not significantly 
correlated with branch network and credit to the public sector. As expected, we also find that the 
share of demand deposits (a proxy for retail commercial banks activity) is positively correlated 
with employment and number of branches and therefore overhead costs, but not correlated with 
credit to the public sector. We further find that absolute size is negatively correlated with 
overhead costs, suggesting the presence of economies of scale in both developing and industrial 
countries; this result is in line with previous findings by Mathieson and Roldos (2001). Relative 
size is positively correlated with employment, particularly in industrial countries, a result that 
may suggest that unions force banks with some market power to keep a large number of 
employees.  In industrial countries, we find that both absolute and relative size is negatively 
                                                 
17 In order to improve the readability of the coefficients, we multiplied the two margin variables by 100. 
18 Regression results are available upon request.   19 
 
correlated with the size of the branch network (although the latter is not statistically significant); 
again, we find no correlation in developing countries. No control variable is significantly 
correlated with credit allocation to the public sector.  
The first row of columns 1-3 show that in both industrial and developing countries state- 
owned banks tend to have higher overhead costs relative to total assets than similar domestic 
private banks. The coefficients imply that in industrial countries public banks have overhead 
costs that are between 8 and 10 percent higher than the group average (which is about 2 percent 
in industrial countries and 4 percent in developing countries), the corresponding value for 
developing countries is 5 percent. Hence, the lower profitability of public banks reported in 
Table 4 seems to be due to higher costs rather than lower margins. Again, there are two possible 
interpretations for these results. The first is that public banks are less efficient than their private 
counterparts and that this difference in efficiency is reflected by higher overhead costs.  The 
second is that public banks provide services that generate externalities and hence have higher 
operating costs.  The second row shows that in both developing and industrial countries foreign 
banks have much lower overhead costs than domestic private banks (about 30 percent less than 
the group average in developing countries and 10 percent less than the group average in 
industrial countries). These findings corroborate the results of Table 4 and support the idea that 
in developing countries foreign banks tend to be more efficient and profitable than their domestic 
counterparts, while in industrial countries the difference between the two types of banks is 
smaller.  
Columns 4 -6 show that in developing countries public banks  tend to have a higher 
employment ratio than domestic private banks (the difference is about 9 percent of the average 
for developing countries) and that foreign banks tend to have lower employment (the difference 
is about 25 percent of the group average). T o test whether differences in overhead costs are 
explained by high levels of employment, we augmented the regression of column 2 with a 
measure of employment over total assets.
20 We find that this latter variable is statistically 
significant and that, once  we control for employment, the dummies for public and foreign 
ownership drop in both magnitude and level of statistical significance (PUB is no longer 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 As in the case of net interest margin, we multiplied overhead costs over total assets and share of government loans 
by 100 to improve the readability of the coefficients. 
20 The results are available from the authors upon request.   20 
 
significant and FOR remains marginally significant at the ten percent confidence level). In 
industrial countries we find no strong correlation between bank ownership and employment; 
while foreign banks have lower employment, the coefficient is only marginally significant.  As 
before, the finding that public banks in developing countries have higher employment ratios can 
be interpreted in terms of efficiency or in terms of services provided. For instance, it has been 
argued that one of the roles of public banks is to provide banking service to isolated rural areas 
(Levy-Yeyati and Panizza, 2004). Such activity would lead to higher overhead costs and higher 
employment ratio. While we do not have information on whether public banks do provide 
banking services to rural areas, we do have some information on the size of the branch network. 
In analyzing such data, it is reasonable to think that if public banks do accomplish their 
role of providing service to isolated areas, they should have a relatively high number of small 
branches and hence a high ratio of branches relative to total assets. Columns 7 -9 test this 
hypothesis and find that public banks in developing countries do have more branches (expressed 
as a ratio of total assets) than their domestic counterparts, but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. We also find that foreign banks have fewer branches and that, in industrial countries 
there is no correlation between ownership and branch network.  While the results of columns 7-9 
should be taken with some caution because they are based on a much smaller number of banks 
(less than one quarter of our observations have information on the size of the branch network), 
they seem to support the idea that the higher overhead costs, higher employment ratios and lower 
profitability of public banks in developing countries are partly due to a more extensive branch 
network.  
 Public banks are often viewed as an instrument to direct credit to the public sector. The 
last three columns test whether there is a correlation between ownership and credit to the public 
sector. No evidence is found of such a correlation. Again, the results should be interpreted with 
caution because the sample for which we have data on credit allocation is extremely small. 
 
3.2.3  Loan Provisions and Non-Performing Loans 
   
The last set of exercises focuses on loan provisions and non-performing loans. Ownership may 
be correlated with non-performing loans (NPL) because public (foreign) banks could have lower 
(higher) credit scoring or loan recovery ability (in this case higher NPL would be associated with 
less efficient banks) or because public banks may be willing to finance risky projects that   21 
 
generate positive externalities (in this case higher NPL would merely reflect the development 
mandate of state-owned banks).  
  Table 6 reports the results.
21 In developing countries, we find that higher non-interest 
income and absolute size are positively correlated with NPL and that relative size is negatively 
correlated with NPL expressed as a share of total assets or total loans.  In industrial countries, we 
find that absolute size is negatively and significantly correlated with NPL.  
  Column 2 of Table 6 shows that in developing countries the share of NPL of public banks 
is higher than that of private domestic banks.  The effect of public ownership on NPL is 
incredibly large: the coefficient of 6.5 corresponds to 50 percent of the developing country 
average (which is 12 percent).  We also find that foreign banks located in developing countries 
have higher NPL than their domestic counterparts. The coefficient, however, is much lower than 
that of public banks. We find no correlation between ownership status and NPL in industrial 
countries.  
  This high level of NPL could be either due to incompetence and inefficiencies or to the 
development mandate of public banks.  In the former case, if all managers follow the same 
policy in terms of provisions, the level of provisions of public banks should not be different from 
that of private banks (unless public bank managers internalize their incompetence and 
acknowledge it by setting higher provisions). In the latter case, managers of public banks expect 
more NPL and hence keep higher provisions. Column 5 shows that, in developing countries, 
provisions are indeed higher for public banks (the coefficient implies that the difference between 
provisions in public banks and private banks is close to 30 percent of the developing country 
average). This indicates that public banks do expect higher levels of non-performing loans than 
private domestic banks.  In industrial countries, provisions of public banks are slightly lower 
than those of private banks.  Foreign ownership is not significantly correlated with loan 
provision.  
   
                                                 
21 Table 6 focuses on NPL and provisions measured as a share of total loans, regressions that use NPL and 
provisions as share of total assets yield similar results. All the dependent variables have been multiplied by 100 to 
make the coefficients readable.   22 
 
3.3   Selection, Dynamic, and Static Effects  
 
In a recent paper, Berger et al. (2004) point out that in studying the correlation between bank 
ownership and bank performance, one should distinguish among static effects (i.e., the average 
difference between performance of, say, public and private banks), dynamic effects (i.e., the 
effects of change in ownership due to, say, privatization or foreign acquisition), and selection 
effects (i.e., effects that occur if there is a correlation between bank performance and the 
likelihood of an ownership change, such as poorly performing banks’ greater likelihood of 
privatization).  These authors argue that if these effects go in separate directions (for instance, 
the static and dynamic effects of private ownership are positive but only underperforming banks 
get privatized), the simple model of Equation (1) will yield biased estimations. They suggest a 
specification that jointly estimates the static, dynamic, and selection effects. 
As shown in Table 7, our sample includes 19 banks that were made public (0.20 percent 
of the total number of banks); almost all of these banks were located in developing countries. 
Clearly, this is a rare event, caused by bank restructuring in the wake of a crisis. We also have 
100 banks (1.05 percent of the total number of banks) that were privatized and acquired by 
domestic investors. The table indicates that privatizations were more prevalent i n developing 
countries (60 percent of the total) than in industrial countries.  Finally, we have 200 banks that 
were acquired by foreign investors (2.10 percent of total number of banks). Again, foreign 
acquisitions were more prevalent in developing countries than in industrial countries.   
In what follows, we adopt a strategy similar to the one suggested by Berger et al. (2004) 
and estimate the following model:
22  
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where  t j i PUB STAT , , _  ( t j i PUB STAT , , _ ) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if bank 
i is public (foreign) and did not change ownership in the period under observation (the excluded 
dummy is  t j i RIV STAT , , _ ). Therefore  1 a  and  2 a  measure the static effects of public and foreign 
                                                 
22 The main difference between our regressions and those of Berger et al. (2004) is that we do not control for the 
effect of domestic mergers and acquisitions for which we do not have data.   23 
 
ownership expressed as a difference from the performance of private domestically owned banks 
that never changed ownership.  t j i PUB SEL , , _  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for 
banks that used to have a different form of ownership but became public during the period under 
observation.  t j i PRIV SEL , , _ , and  t j i FOR SEL , , _  are defined in similar ways and take the value 
of one for banks that were privatized or were acquired by a foreign company during the period 
under observation.
23 Therefore  1 b ,  2 b , and  3 b  measure the selection effects of public, private, 
and foreign ownership (so,  2 b  measures the pre-privatization performance of state-owned banks 
that will be privatized relative to that of domestically owned private banks that have no change in 
ownership).  Finally,  t j i PUB DYN , , _  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one after a bank 
changes ownership and becomes public and zero before.   t j i PRIV DYN , , _  and  t j i FOR DYN , , _  
are defined similarly for banks that are privatized or acquired by foreigners. Therefore,  1 f ,  2 f , 
and  3 f  measure the dynamic effect of ownership change. For instance,  2 f  measures post- 
privatization performance relative to pre-privatization performance among banks that were 
selected to be privatized, and  2 b +  2 f  measures the post-privatization performance of state-
owned banks relative to that of domestically owned private banks that have no change in 
ownership.   t j, h  and  t j i X , ,  are defined as in Equation (1). 
   
3.3.1   Static Effects 
 
Table 8 reports the results for ROA, ROE, overhead costs and non-performing loans. In most 
cases, the static coefficients for public and foreign ownership are similar (both in their magnitude 
and level of statistical significance) to the ownership coefficients described in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
The only exception is the coefficient for public ownership in the ROA and overhead regressions 
for the sample of industrial countries. In the case of ROA, Table 4 found a coefficient of -0.06, 
which is not statistically significant. The point estimates of Table 8 find a statistically significant 
coefficient of -0.13, which indicates that in industrial countries there is also an unfavorable static 
effect of public ownership. It should be pointed out that, while the effect is statistically 
                                                 
23 If a bank has more than one change in ownership, we use the last change (this is the strategy followed by Berger 
et al., 2004).  So, if a bank was public, then sold to domestic investors and subsequently acquired by a foreign 
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significant at the 5-percent confidence level, the effect is still rather small (the coefficient is just 
above 10 percent of the industrial country average) when compared with that of developing 
countries (which is close to 50 percent of the developing country average ROA). Furthermore, 
we still do not find any statistically significant coefficient when we focus on ROE in industrial 
countries (column 6). In the case of overhead costs, Table 5 (column 3) shows that public banks 
located in industrial countries have overhead costs that are significantly higher than those of 
domestic private banks. However, after controlling for dynamic and selection effects, we find 
that this difference is no longer statistically significant in the sample of industrial countries.  
Public banks in developing countries, however, still have higher overhead costs. 
Columns 11 and 12 confirm previous findings that state owned banks located in 
developing countries tend to have higher non-performing loans than their private counterparts 
but that in industrial countries there is no correlation between ownership and NPL. When we 
focus on foreign ownership, the results of Table 8 confirm the previous findings that foreign 
ownership is positively correlated with profitability in developing countries and not correlated 
with profitability in industrial countries. We also find that foreign banks tend to have lower 
overhead costs in both industrial and developing countries. Additionally, we find no correlation 
between foreign ownership and NPL in industrial countries, but we do find that foreign banks 
located in developing countries have higher NPL than their domestic counterparts. 
 
3.3.2  Selection Effects   
 
In the sample of developing countries, we find that the selection effect of public ownership is 
almost never statistically significant. The exception is for NPL, where we find that banks that are 
selected to become public have higher NPL. This is probably due to the fact that only distressed 
banks were nationalized or taken over. In the same sample of countries, we find that the selection 
effect of foreign ownership is negative for both ROA and ROE and not statistically significant 
for overhead costs or non-performing loans. This indicates that foreign banks tend to acquire 
banks that have low levels of profitability but that this low profitability is not necessarily due to 
higher overhead costs or higher levels of non-performing loans. Considering that in developing 
countries several privatized banks were acquired by foreign banks, our finding of a negative 
                                                                                                                                                             
company, we assign value one to  t j i FOR SEL , , _  and zero to  t j i PUB SEL , , _  and  t j i PRIV SEL , , _ .   25 
 
coefficient for Selection Foreign is in line with the existing evidence suggesting that less 
profitable banks are more likely to be privatized (Berger et al., 2004).
24 
In the sample of industrial countries, no bank was selected to become public. The 
privatization selection effect is positive and statistically significant for overhead costs (indicating 
that banks that are selected to be privatized and acquired by domestic investors tend to have 
higher overhead costs than domestic private banks that never change ownership) and marginally 
significant for NPL indicating that domestic investors targeted distressed banks.  The foreign 
selection effect is positive and statistically significant for ROA but never significant in the other 
regressions.  
 
3.3.3   Dynamic Effects 
 
In the sample of developing countries, we find a strong negative effect of  PUB DYN _  on ROA 
and ROE. This result is probably due to the fact that most of the banks that became public did so 
because they were involved in a banking crisis (a fact that is consistent with our previous finding 
that  PUB SEL_ is positively correlated with NPL).  Interestingly, we also find that the dynamic 
effect of privatization by domestic banks is negative for both ROA and ROE, although not 
statistically significant at standard levels. This finding indicates that acquisition of public banks 
by domestic investors may reduce bank profitability.
25    
Focusing on developing countries, we find that the dynamic effect of foreign ownership 
on profitability is positive but never statistically significant. This result is in contrast with what 
Berger et al. (2004) found in their sample of Argentinean banks. This difference in results may 
be due to the fact that in our sample the Dynamic Foreign variable might be capturing the 
increase in profitability of previously public banks with low initial profitability that were 
acquired by foreign institutions. Columns 8 and 11 show that in developing countries the 
dynamic effects of privatization and foreign ownership are never significantly correlated with 
overhead costs and NPL.  
                                                 
24 In contrast with our sample, in the sample of Berger et al. ( 2004), privatized banks were mostly acquired by 
domestic investors.  
25 At least this is the case for the post-privatization average. Berger et al. (2004) find some difference between short-
run and long-run effects. Unfortunately, our panel is not long enough to distinguish between the two types of effects.   26 
 
When we focus on industrial countries, we find that the dynamic effect of privatization 
has a negative effect on profitability, although not statistically significant at standard levels, and 
a negative and statistically significant effect on overhead costs.
26 This latter result suggests that 
privatization leads to cost-reduction activities. In fact, if we study the effect of ownership on 
employment, we find that the dynamic effect of privatization is large (indicating that after 
privatization, employment drops by approximately 25 percent) and marginally significant (the p 
value is 0.11).  However, these cost-reduction activities do translate into higher profitability. 
This is probably due to the fact that net interest margins tend to decrease after privatization.
27 
Interestingly, we find that, as in the case of developing countries, privatizations are associated 
with higher non-performing loans (this may be due to the fact that the privatization process put 
on the book loans that were de facto but not de jure non-performing) Finally, we find that the 
dynamic effects of foreign ownership are associated with lower ROA and ROE and higher non-
performing loans.  
A possible interpretation for the results described above is that, in industrial countries, the 
privatization process involved the most inefficient state-owned banks (as implied by the positive 
Private Selection  Effect in the overhead regression) and that, under new management, these 
banks became more efficient and cost effective (as implied by the negative Private Dynamic 
Effect in the overhead regression). This interpretation is consistent with the fact that in the 
regressions of column 3 of Table 5 (which did not separate static effects from dynamic and 
selection effects) public ownership was significantly correlated with overhead costs, but that this 
correlation is no longer significant once the selection effect of privatization is controlled for (i.e., 
once one recognizes that the most inefficient public banks are those most likely to be privatized).  
In the sample of industrial countries, the finding that Selection Foreign is positively 
correlated with ROA might be due to the fact that during the 1990s foreign banks targeted their 
acquisitions on banks that enjoyed high profitability not because they were more efficient—in 
fact the foreign selection effect is not statistically significant in the overhead regression—but 
because they were protected from competition. However, the entry of foreign banks, which was 
the fruit of the globalization process of the banking industry that characterized most of the 1990s, 
                                                 
26 Therefore, our results are somewhat in contrast with those of Verbrugge, Owens and Megginson (2000), who find 
that bank privatization in OECD countries leads to higher profitability ratios. 
27 Full regression results for employment and net interest margins are available upon request.    27 
 
might have led to a situation in which previously protected and highly profitable banks faced a 
sudden drop in their profitability (a fact that is consistent with the negative coefficient for 
Dynamic Foreign in column 3 of Table 8).
28  
Taken together, all these results confirm our previous finding that public ownership has a 
negative effect on bank performance in developing countries but no strong effect on bank 
performance in industrial countries (the only difference is that private banks tend to have slightly 
lower costs). At the same time, foreign ownership is associated with a positive effect on long-run 
bank performance in developing countries and either no effect or a negative effect on long-run 
bank performance in industrial countries.
29   
 
4.  Ownership Structure and the Performance of Domestic Private Banks 
 
In the previous section it was suggested that the globalization of the banking industry in the 
1990s might have affected the profitability of domestic banks. In the final section of this paper, 
we check whether changes in ownership structure (i.e., entry of foreign banks and the 
privatization process) affect the environment in which domestic private banks operate.  Here the 
key reference is Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), who find that an increase in the 
presence of foreign banks leads to a reduction in the profitability and interest margins of 
domestic banks.
30  We estimate how changes in ownership structure affect the environment in 
which domestic private banks operate by estimating the following model: 
 
t j i i t j t j t j i t j t j t j i M X SHPUB SHFOR PERF , , , , , , , , , ' ' e m n h q g b a + + + + + + + =   (3) 
 
As in the previous regressions,  t j i PERF , ,  is a performance indicator for bank  i in country j at 
time t. However, now we only use observations for private domestic banks and hence exclude 
foreign and state-owned banks from the sample. We adopt this strategy because we are interested 
                                                 
28 As some privatizations involved entry of foreign banks, the hypothesis described in the text is consistent with the 
finding of a negative and statistically significant Static Public effect in column 3 of Table 8 and no significant 
relationship between public ownership and ROA in column 3 of Table 4.  The fact that the Selection Foreign 
dummy is not statistically significant in column 6 of Table 8 seems to indicate that the institutions targeted by 
foreign entrants were well capitalized.  
29 Again, it is worth pointing out that in developing countries there is some heterogeneity across regions.  
30 There are several other papers that study how foreign entry affect the performance of domestic banks, but these 
papers either focus on just one country (Barajas, Steiner and Salazar, 1999, focus on Colombia, Clarke et al., 2000, 
on Argentina, and Denizer, 2000, on Turkey) or a region (Claessens and Glaessner, 1999, and Laeven, 1999, focus 
on Asia and Crystal, Dages and Goldberg, 2001, focus on Latin America).    28 
 
in how changes in ownership structure at the country level affect the performance of domestic 
private banks.   t j SHFOR ,  is a variable that measures the share of total bank assets controlled by 
foreign-owned banks in country j at time t. Hence, a  measures how foreign bank entry affects 
the performance of domestic private banks.  t j SHPUB ,  is a variable that measures the share of 
total bank assets controlled by state-owned banks in country j at time  t, and  b  captures how 
changes in the share of state-owned banks affect the performance of domestic private banks. 
t j i X , ,  is a set of bank-level controls including equity over total assets, non-interest bearing assets 
over total assets, demand deposits over total deposits, and the lag of total assets (in logs).   t j, m  is 
a set of macroeconomics controls that include GDP growth, inflation, and the real interest rate.
31  
Finally, we include fixed effects at the country ( j h ), year ( t n ), and bank ( i m ) level. It is worth 
noting that bank fixed effects imply that all our econometric identification comes from changes 
over time within banks. This makes our empirical specification analogous to estimating the 
model in first differences (in fact, if we only had two periods, fixed effects and first differences 
would yield identical results).
32  
   Table 9 reports the results. We find that foreign share and public share are never 
significantly correlated with profit before taxes (columns 1-3). In the sub-sample of developing 
countries, however, foreign share is negatively and significantly correlated with interest margin, 
overhead costs and provisions (column 5, 8 and 9). We also find that the share of public banks 
has a negative and statistically significant correlation with interest margins of banks located in 
developing countries. In the sample of industrial countries, we find that foreign and public share 
are never correlated with bank performance.  
When we focus on the macroeconomic variables, we find that in the sample of 
developing countries, GDP growth is positively correlated with profitability and negatively 
correlated with interest margin, overheads and provisions and that inflation is positively 
correlated with profitability and provision and negatively correlated with overheads. Finally, the 
real interest rate is almost never significantly correlated with bank performance (it is marginally 
significant for the profitability regression that includes both developing and industrial countries).  
                                                 
31 When we chose the set of bank-level and macro controls, we tried to adopt the same specification adopted by 
Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), with some notable exceptions that are discussed below. 
32 Below, we discuss why we prefer fixed effects to first differences.   29 
 
In the sub-sample of industrial countries, we find that the macroeconomic variables are never 
statistically significant.  
These results are somewhat different and often stronger than those of Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). First of all, while they find a negative and statistically 
significant correlation between Foreign Share and profit before taxes, we find that this 
correlation is positive but not statistically significant; this result is in line with what Levy-Yeyati 
and Micco (2003) found for a sample of eight Latin American countries.
33  In the cases of Net 
Margins, Overheads, and Provisions our results go in the direction as the findings of Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). However, while they found a negative but not statistically 
significant correlation between each of these variables and effect of foreign share, we find that 
the correlation is negative and always statistically significant for the whole sample and the sub-
sample of developing countries.
34    
  There are two possible explanations for the difference in results described above. The 
first has to do with differences in the estimation method and the second with the fact that we use 
data for a different period (1995-2002 versus 1988-1995) and have a larger sample of banks 
(19,213 bank observations versus 7,900). There are six differences in the estimation method:  
 
(1) Rather than estimating the various equations in first differences, we introduce 
bank fixed effects. We think that the latter strategy is preferable because it is 
able to capture the effect of changes in foreign penetration and public bank 
share even when these effects materialize with a lag.
35 
(2) Rather than measuring foreign (public) share as the number of foreign (public) 
banks over total number of banks in the country, we measure foreign and 
public share by using the share of assets of these two categories of banks over 
total bank assets in a given country and year. We think that this strategy is 
                                                 
33 When we restrict our sample to Latin America, the coefficient is positive and significant at standard levels.  
34 There are also some differences in the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables.  In particular, we do not find 
that the real interest rate is significantly correlated with profits or overheads and that growth is negatively correlated 
with overheads (in fact we find that the correlation between growth and overheads is positive and statistically 
significant). 
35 If we were to use first differences, we would only capture contemporaneous effects and hence would need to 
augment the equation with lagged values of the change in foreign and public bank shares plus the lag of the 
dependent variable to be able to capture non-contemporaneous effects. This last specification would have the 
standard dynamic panel data complications and make the results much more difficult to interpret.   30 
 
preferable because it makes clear that a foreign (or public) bank that controls 
50 percent of the domestic banking market will have a bigger effect than a 
branch of a foreign bank that operates mostly in the wholesale market.
36  
(3) Rather than focusing only on foreign share, we focus on both public and 
foreign share and run our regression by using only domestic private banks. 
This is important if one thinks that public banks may have an objective 
function different from that of private banks.  
(4) In all regressions we use clustered standard errors. This is extremely important 
because this estimation strategy recognizes that there is no within country-
year variation in the macroeconomic coefficients and corrects the standard 
error accordingly. Without clustering one would get standard errors that are 
too small and hence  reject the null too often (Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004).  
(5) There are some small differences in the set of controls. In particular, we do 
not control for GDP per capita and for overhead costs. We exclude the first 
variable because it is highly correlated with country fixed effects and GDP 
growth and exclude the second variable because we think it is endogenous. At 
the same time, we also control for the share of total assets.  
(6) All our regressions are weighted by share of total assets and not by one over 
number of banks in a given country-year. 
 
  To check whether our results are driven by differences in estimations, we re-estimated all 
the equations in Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), exactly following their 
methodology but using our data. However, even using their methodology we could not reproduce 
their results. In fact, we were surprised to find that our results are closer to those of Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) when we use our preferred methodology. This suggests that 
our results are not driven by differences in the estimation methodology. A more likely possibility 
                                                 
36 The distinction between share expressed as a number of banks and share expressed as a fraction of total assets 
may be important because Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that their results are not statistically 
significant if they measure foreign ownership by using asset shares.    31 
 
is that having a larger sample allows us to estimate more precisely the relationship between 
domestic bank performance and foreign bank entry.
37  
It is also possible that the difference in results is driven by the fact that the two datasets 
include somewhat different samples of countries and that the coefficients are not homogenous 
across groups of countries. To check this hypothesis, we run the profitability r egressions 
separately for East Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and 
South Asia and find that foreign bank entry is negatively correlated with the profitability of 
domestic banks in the first three groups of countries and positively correlated with profitability in 
the last two groups of countries. These results confirm the previous findings by Levy-Yeyati and 
Micco (2003) that foreign bank entry is positively correlated with bank profitability in Latin 
America (however their sample includes all commercial banks and does not limit the analysis to 
domestically owned private banks).   
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper describes the construction of a new dataset on bank characteristics and bank 
performance and uses this dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank 
performance. The paper finds that in the case of industrial countries there is no correlation 
between bank ownership and bank performance, but that there is a strong correlation between 
bank ownership and bank performance in developing countries. In particular, we find that state-
owned banks located in developing countries tend to be characterized by lower profitability, 
higher overhead costs, and higher non-performing loans than their private counterparts.  We find 
the opposite for foreign-owned banks that, in our sample of developing countries, are 
characterized by higher profitability and lower overhead costs.   
It is also important to note that the paper shows that there is some heterogeneity within 
the sub-sample of developing countries.  In particular, while the results for state-owned banks do 
not vary significantly across different developing regions, there are large differences in the 
performance of foreign-owned banks. For instance, the paper shows that, in most cases, foreign 
bank performance in Latin America seems to be different from foreign bank performance in the 
“average” developing country (Table A2). While this contrast is beyond the scope of this paper, 
                                                 
37 This is the case for Net Margins, Overheads, and Provisions. The difference in profitability remains puzzling.    32 
 
it would be interesting to conduct further research aimed at documenting these differences in 
greater detail and trying to explain what drives them.   
We are not able to test whether the lower profitability of public banks is due to 
mismanagement or a development mandate and hence we cannot express any value judgment on 
the desirability of having state-owned banks. However, we are able to test whether the entry of 
foreign banks affects the environment in which domestic banks operate.  We find that, in the sub-
sample of developing countries, foreign bank entry is associated with an increase in efficiency 
(as expressed by lower overhead costs) and competitiveness of the banking sector (as expressed 
by lower interest margin). As these two factors tend to balance each other, we find no significant 
correlation between foreign bank entry and profitability.  These are important results because 
they suggest that entry of foreign banks (which could be related with new technology and/or 
lower entry barriers) is a healthy phenomenon that plays an important role in increasing the 
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Table 1. Correlation between Ownership and Concentration Share 
within Alternative Datasets* 
 
  Using Consolidated  
Balance Sheets 
Using Unconsolidated Balance 
Sheets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





































Concentration Barth et 









* p-values in parentheses 









Table 2. Number of Banks Included in the Dataset 
 
  Caribbean 











Africa  TOTAL 
  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For  Priv  Pub  For 
1995  23  4  10  168  39  40  167  43  42  3,712  62  272  240  50  140  131  27  25  75  31  4  81  16  43  4,597  272  576 
1996  26  5  12  179  43  45  209  42  46  3,829  62  282  254  47  151  137  26  25  79  30  5  112  17  47  4,825  272  613 
1997  28  6  12  186  50  44  252  44  55  3,972  60  288  285  46  162  138  27  25  84  28  5  138  13  52  5,083  274  643 
1998  38  6  11  207  53  47  301  41  67  4,331  49  308  319  43  190  143  25  26  89  28  5  143  13  54  5,571  258  708 
1999  41  6  14  211  50  51  298  32  78  4,367  45  315  345  43  204  146  24  26  90  28  5  137  11  58  5,635  239  751 
2000  41  5  17  168  50  55  269  33  102  4,102  38  345  275  30  215  128  25  26  89  29  6  142  10  77  5,214  220  843 
2001  42  3  20  175  53  56  310  31  112  4,313  29  380  288  35  222  131  25  27  95  28  6  157  11  79  5,511  215  902 
2002  43  3  20  173  53  56  295  25  115  4,271  28  386  292  41  233  133  25  28  94  26  4  147  11  80  5,448  212  922 
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Table 3. Median Values of Variables excluding Specialized Governmental Credit Institutions* 
 


































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Dom.Priv.  62%  1.91%  17.21%  8.51%  4.76%  3.10%  5.38%  1.00  33.45%  2.04%  316.67%  1.42% 
Public  12%  1.76%  15.04%  10.99%  5.00%  1.95%  4.30%  0.96  59.90%  3.14%  700.00%  0.92%  Caribbean 
Foreign  25%  2.82%  24.05%  8.15%  4.23%  2.88%  3.44%  0.84  35.80%  2.08%  508.33%  0.85% 
Dom.Priv.  53%  0.65%  7.49%  4.52%  3.05%  1.65%  2.58%  1.00  16.27%  3.89%  522.85%  1.44% 
Public  24%  -0.96%  2.40%  3.34%  2.02%  0.75%  1.83%  0.95  21.27%  4.44%  573.21%  1.58%  East Asia and Pacific 
Foreign  23%  1.43%  19.16%  5.37%  3.28%  1.97%  2.62%  0.82  22.71%  4.30%  481.82%  1.42% 
Dom.Priv.  48%  1.54%  12.13%  9.58%  5.71%  5.05%  6.33%  1.00  39.16%  4.52%  280.00%  4.33% 
Public  23%  0.58%  11.51%  8.97%  4.96%  3.87%  5.88%  1.07  34.83%  3.99%  376.09%  3.53% 
East Europe and 
Central Asia 
Foreign  29%  3.01%  20.16%  9.59%  5.01%  5.03%  5.10%  0.77  38.64%  2.68%  387.50%  1.93% 
Dom.Priv.  70%  0.77%  14.81%  2.97%  1.80%  1.25%  1.86%  1.02  26.26%  1.04%  470.24%  0.54% 
Public  10%  0.63%  9.36%  2.62%  1.66%  0.81%  1.37%  0.83  26.11%  2.43%  690.91%  0.62%  Industrial Countries 
Foreign  20%  0.78%  13.03%  2.74%  1.63%  1.76%  2.22%  0.91  17.64%  0.98%  412.20%  0.59% 
Dom.Priv.  51%  1.17%  13.06%  8.84%  5.63%  2.72%  5.83%  1.00  17.18%  3.10%  261.51%  2.28% 
Public  17%  0.50%  9.10%  8.76%  5.15%  3.40%  6.36%  1.05  22.23%  4.24%  365.00%  2.30%  Latin America 
Foreign  32%  1.24%  11.28%  8.59%  5.10%  3.10%  5.27%  1.00  17.69%  3.29%  281.25%  2.34% 
Dom.Priv.  67%  1.35%  13.25%  4.06%  2.65%  1.31%  1.85%  1.00  16.86%  4.45%  835.63%  1.11% 
Public  19%  1.48%  12.98%  8.41%  2.87%  1.26%  2.04%  1.16  19.22%  7.03%  1335.83%  1.07% 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Foreign  14%  1.24%  12.34%  3.70%  2.30%  1.25%  1.75%  0.91  19.10%  3.13%  700.00%  1.04% 
Dom.Priv.  42%  1.10%  18.91%  4.48%  2.94%  1.77%  2.65%  1.00  15.19%  4.89%  619.15%  1.60% 
Public  40%  0.18%  9.42%  4.21%  2.51%  1.40%  2.86%  1.01  20.06%  8.06%  933.33%  1.69%  South Asia 
Foreign  18%  0.66%  5.47%  4.88%  3.14%  2.06%  3.23%  1.00  15.80%  10.45%  450.00%  2.08% 
Dom.Priv.  44%  2.21%  24.35%  10.64%  5.83%  4.35%  5.57%  1.00  55.74%  4.82%  489.64%  3.92% 
Public  11%  2.57%  26.80%  13.98%  6.99%  4.08%  6.28%  1.01  73.21%  5.35%  488.10%  2.56%  Sub Saharan Africa 
Foreign  46%  3.17%  30.21%  11.58%  6.43%  4.23%  5.43%  1.00  52.94%  4.27%  373.26%  2.20% 
 
* All variables are weighted.   39 
 
Table 4. Bank Ownership, Profitability and Interest Margin 
 
  ROA  ROE  Marg/TA  Marg/L+D 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Public   -0.571  -0.731  -0.060  -4.870  -6.282  -0.187  -0.232  -0.277  -0.079  -0.018  -0.026  -0.055 
  (0.079)***  (0.102)***  (0.050)  (0.741)***  (0.942)***  (0.587)  (0.072)***  (0.093)***  (0.052)  (0.187)  (0.236)  (0.074) 
Foreign   0.246  0.305  0.007  1.687  2.227  -0.545  0.011  0.074  -0.217  0.004  0.048  -0.213 
  (0.069)***  (0.091)***  (0.035)  (0.614)***  (0.796)***  (0.484)  (0.061)  (0.080)  (0.049)***  (0.139)  (0.186)  (0.064)*** 
Non Int Inc/TA  0.007  -0.001  0.128  -0.047  -0.113  0.828  -0.017  -0.023  0.047  0.019  0.001  0.176 
  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.010)***  (0.211)  (0.234)  (0.094)***  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.018)***  (0.037)  (0.043)  (0.021)*** 
Dda Dep/TDep  0.006  0.009  0.000  0.021  0.039  -0.012  0.015  0.016  0.013  0.027  0.033  0.016 
  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)  (0.013)*  (0.020)**  (0.009)  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.004)***  (0.006)***  (0.001)*** 
Lag TA (ln)  0.027  0.069  -0.026  1.092  1.744  0.506  -0.176  -0.175  -0.174  -0.265  -0.389  -0.202 
  (0.019)  (0.044)  (0.008)***  (0.157)***  (0.349)***  (0.121)***  (0.019)***  (0.042)***  (0.014)***  (0.046)***  (0.116)***  (0.017)*** 
Lag Share  -0.158  -0.451  0.098  0.832  -2.964  2.705  1.046  1.145  0.489  0.981  1.641  0.316 
  (0.304)  (0.463)  (0.179)  (2.236)  (3.362)  (2.345)  (0.276)***  (0.423)***  (0.195)**  (0.617)  (1.015)  (0.319) 
Observations  18583  5379  13204  18467  5302  13165  18723  5363  13360  18583  5332  13251 
R-squared  0.4914  0.4814  0.5607  0.5109  0.5134  0.5139  0.7879  0.7453  0.6205  0.7357  0.6955  0.5999 
Group  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share.     
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Table 5. Bank Ownership versus Overheads, Employment, Branches and Credit to the Public Sector 
 
  OH/TA  Emp/TA  Branch/TA  Gov L/TA 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Public   0.236  0.238  0.166  0.114  0.153  -0.039  0.075  0.112  -0.071  -0.411  -0.166   
  (0.067)***  (0.081)***  (0.062)***  (0.038)***  (0.055)***  (0.052)  (0.074)  (0.088)  (0.094)  (0.825)  (1.182)   
Foreign   -0.498  -0.598  -0.185  -0.249  -0.369  -0.061  -0.301  -0.377  0.120  0.377  1.258  -0.852 
  (0.070)***  (0.089)***  (0.061)***  (0.038)***  (0.056)***  (0.051)  (0.085)***  (0.096)***  (0.087)  (0.978)  (2.292)  (0.370)** 
Non Int Inc/TA  0.448  0.415  0.717  0.020  0.014  0.087  0.016  0.019  0.005  -0.531  -0.816  -0.063 
  (0.048)***  (0.051)***  (0.046)***  (0.009)**  (0.007)**  (0.014)***  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.361)  (0.639)  (0.082) 
Dda Dep/TDep  0.013  0.014  0.013  0.010  0.005  0.013  0.011  0.010  0.006  0.013  0.020  0.008 
  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)**  (0.001)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.002)***  (0.033)  (0.055)  (0.011) 
Lag TA (ln)  -0.102  -0.133  -0.094  -0.096  -0.020  -0.109  -0.078  0.009  -0.164  0.293  0.728  -0.007 
  (0.020)***  (0.042)***  (0.015)***  (0.011)***  (0.026)  (0.012)***  (0.025)***  (0.044)  (0.016)***  (0.217)  (0.809)  (0.075) 
Lag Share  -0.822  -0.950  0.088  0.333  -0.091  0.569  -0.091  -0.445  -0.461  -0.773  -6.335  2.481 
  (0.249)***  (0.369)**  (0.212)  (0.163)**  (0.302)  (0.187)***  (0.461)  (0.615)  (0.393)  (5.632)  (10.212)  (1.671) 
Observations  18732  5381  13351  11611  1856  9755  3781  1423  2358  938  193  745 
R-squared  0.7997  0.7742  0.7829  0.9127  0.8680  0.7217  0.8289  0.7907  0.8425  0.8691  0.8568  0.7690 
Group  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   41 
 
Table 6. Bank Ownership versus Loan Provisions and Non-Performing Loans 
 
  NPL/L  Prov/L  NPL/Prov 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Public   5.381  6.454  0.313  0.833  1.111  -0.126  92.219  81.782  69.659 
  (0.834)***  (1.061)***  (0.298)  (0.184)***  (0.236)***  (0.072)*  (62.483)  (75.300)  (86.444) 
Foreign   0.934  1.274  0.207  -0.150  -0.221  0.022  85.977  -21.752  453.453 
  (0.504)*  (0.648)**  (0.209)  (0.119)  (0.159)  (0.064)  (56.072)  (43.994)  (179.270)** 
Non Int Inc/TA  1.523  1.669  -0.007  0.438  0.483  0.067  -7.688  -1.296  -41.997 
  (0.361)***  (0.375)***  (0.068)  (0.098)***  (0.110)***  (0.015)***  (6.227)  (6.169)  (28.902) 
Dda Dep/TDep  0.002  0.006  0.003  -0.009  -0.009  -0.004  -1.722  -3.735  3.844 
  (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.006)  (0.004)**  (0.007)  (0.001)***  (2.802)  (3.909)  (2.462) 
Lag TA (ln)  -0.004  0.461  -0.161  -0.256  -0.521  -0.066  7.995  73.828  -42.262 
  (0.137)  (0.320)  (0.069)**  (0.057)***  (0.138)***  (0.017)***  (15.939)  (33.593)**  (19.790)** 
Lag Share  -5.100  -9.647  2.173  1.827  3.598  0.404  -188.739  -694.425  1,160.559 
  (2.474)**  (3.408)***  (1.158)*  (0.788)**  (1.278)***  (0.460)  (222.099)  (296.358)**  (458.748)** 
Observations  8394  2688  5706  14318  3905  10413  7086  2233  4853 
R-squared  0.5947  0.5613  0.6011  0.5844  0.5636  0.4052  0.5137  0.5368  0.4697 
Group  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 











Selected to become 
public 
Selected to be privatized 
and become private 
domestic banks 
Selected to become 
foreign 
    N 
Share of 




Developing  2905  17  0.59%  60  2.07%  142  4.89% 
Industrial  6606  2  0.03%  40  0.61%  58  0.88% 
All countries  9511  119  0.20%  100  1.05%  200  2.10% 
BANKS INCLUDED IN THE REGRESSIONS 
Developing  1491  12  0.80%  33  2.21%  83  5.57% 
Industrial  4140  0  0.00%  27  0.65%  50  1.21% 
All countries  5631  12  0.21%  60  1.07%  133  2.36% 
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Table 8. Bank Ownership, Profitability, Overheads, Non Performing Loans and Dynamic Effects 
 
  ROA  ROE  OH/TA  NPL/L 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Static Pub  -0.601  -0.778  -0.130  -5.214  -6.997  -0.397  0.248  0.261  0.120  6.193  7.424  0.114 
  (0.087)***  (0.114)***  (0.055)**  (0.818)***  (1.053)***  (0.682)  (0.072)***  (0.087)***  (0.075)  (1.039)***  (1.299)***  (0.302) 
Static For  0.285  0.343  0.035  2.305  2.851  -0.262  -0.516  -0.626  -0.192  1.153  1.537  -0.039 
  (0.075)***  (0.100)***  (0.036)  (0.655)***  (0.854)***  (0.521)  (0.075)***  (0.095)***  (0.064)***  (0.578)**  (0.733)**  (0.241) 
Selection Pub  0.027  0.005    4.046  3.710    -0.139  -0.162    6.319  6.499   
  (0.141)  (0.150)    (2.527)  (2.646)    (0.103)  (0.105)    (3.733)*  (3.869)*   
Selection Priv  -0.036  -0.017  0.001  -1.555  -1.825  -0.390  0.123  -0.033  0.256  1.209  0.023  1.458 
  (0.174)  (0.296)  (0.064)  (1.459)  (2.433)  (1.017)  (0.190)  (0.322)  (0.088)***  (0.903)  (1.128)  (0.870)* 
Selection For  -0.314  -0.529  0.137  -3.117  -5.161  1.595  -0.073  -0.107  -0.071  -0.210  -0.132  0.166 
  (0.120)***  (0.162)***  (0.064)**  (1.215)**  (1.608)***  (1.000)  (0.084)  (0.114)  (0.088)  (1.372)  (1.774)  (0.263) 
Dyn. Pub  -1.339  -1.379    -13.306  -13.720    -0.125  -0.077    0.085  -0.027   
  (0.349)***  (0.358)***    (4.925)***  (5.066)***    (0.331)  (0.327)    (5.101)  (5.258)   
Dyn. Priv  -0.120  -0.184  -0.088  -1.899  -2.546  -1.628  -0.217  -0.071  -0.281  1.976  2.825  3.991 
  (0.223)  (0.351)  (0.100)  (1.922)  (2.969)  (1.364)  (0.239)  (0.381)  (0.109)**  (1.284)  (1.619)*  (2.030)** 
Dyn. For.   0.107  0.308  -0.367  -1.284  0.264  -4.701  -0.294  -0.337  -0.072  1.044  1.068  1.096 
  (0.161)  (0.206)  (0.103)***  (1.656)  (2.073)  (1.393)***  (0.166)*  (0.205)  (0.164)  (1.604)  (2.095)  (0.468)** 
Non Int Inc/TA  0.008  -0.001  0.127  -0.047  -0.111  0.817  0.448  0.416  0.718  1.520  1.662  0.014 
  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.010)***  (0.211)  (0.234)  (0.091)***  (0.048)***  (0.051)***  (0.046)***  (0.362)***  (0.377)***  (0.067) 
Dda Dep/TDep  0.006  0.010  0.000  0.022  0.043  -0.011  0.013  0.014  0.013  0.001  0.006  0.003 
  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)  (0.013)*  (0.019)**  (0.010)  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.006) 
Lag TA (ln)  0.035  0.091  -0.023  1.220  2.032  0.554  -0.102  -0.134  -0.096  -0.037  0.395  -0.270 
  (0.019)*  (0.044)**  (0.008)***  (0.161)***  (0.357)***  (0.124)***  (0.020)***  (0.043)***  (0.015)***  (0.136)  (0.316)  (0.055)*** 
Lag Share  -0.187  -0.526  0.101  0.364  -3.693  2.289  -0.786  -0.902  0.117  -5.053  -9.643  2.681 
  (0.304)  (0.459)  (0.181)  (2.226)  (3.354)  (2.354)  (0.244)***  (0.365)**  (0.209)  (2.473)**  (3.377)***  (1.132)** 
Observations  18583  5379  13204  18467  5302  13165  18732  5381  13351  8394  2688  5706 
R-squared  0.4937  0.4842  0.5682  0.5158  0.5200  0.5184  0.7996  0.7742  0.7831  0.5979  0.5653  0.6288 
Group  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9. Performance of Domestic Private Banks 
 
  Profit before Tax over Total Assets  Net Margin over Total Assets  Overheads over Total Assets  Provisions over Total Assets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
SHFOR  0.108  0.151  0.101  -1.895  -4.289  0.662  -1.692  -2.850  -0.072  -1.167  -2.843  0.340 
   (0.662)  (0.963)  (0.518)  (0.898)**  (1.248)***  (0.485)  (0.541)***  (0.779)***  (0.279)  (0.661)*  (1.089)***  (0.280) 
SHPUB  -0.383  -0.440  -0.021  -1.080  -2.975  -0.055  0.039  -0.554  0.251  -0.159  -1.544  -0.129 
   (0.500)  (0.795)  (0.630)  (0.812)  (1.169)**  (0.362)  (0.401)  (0.705)  (0.251)  (0.635)  (1.062)  (0.252) 
EQ/TA  0.124  0.128  0.076  0.037  0.038  0.048  0.019  0.017  0.019  -0.120  -0.127  0.002 
   (0.032)***  (0.033)***  (0.027)***  (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.027)*  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.045)***  (0.044)***  (0.017) 
NON INT ASS/TA  0.118  0.108  0.242  -0.088  -0.092  -0.005  0.404  0.407  0.427  0.213  0.203  0.234 
   (0.063)*  (0.063)*  (0.079)***  (0.096)  (0.094)  (0.028)  (0.067)***  (0.069)***  (0.086)***  (0.082)***  (0.082)**  (0.037)*** 
DDEP/TOTDEP  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  0.017  0.017  0.004  0.011  0.012  0.005  0.024  0.029  -0.005 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.010)*  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.005)**  (0.006)**  (0.003)*  (0.008)***  (0.009)***  (0.004) 
LTA  0.142  0.173  -0.111  0.331  0.504  -0.217  -0.041  -0.023  0.054  0.124  0.217  -0.022 
   (0.241)  (0.275)  (0.257)  (0.394)  (0.451)  (0.183)  (0.206)  (0.230)  (0.169)  (0.295)  (0.316)  (0.153) 
GDP Growth  6.572  5.754  2.846  -7.139  -7.906  0.810  -6.641  -6.739  1.595  -7.858  -7.688  -5.591 
   (2.325)***  (2.312)**  (3.107)  (2.865)**  (2.899)***  (2.239)  (2.351)***  (2.405)***  (2.168)  (2.605)***  (2.630)***  (3.661) 
Inflation  0.046  0.043  0.014  0.036  0.036  0.007  -0.034  -0.036  0.012  0.020  0.028  -0.013 
   (0.016)***  (0.016)***  (0.041)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.015)**  (0.015)**  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.014)*  (0.019) 
Real Interest Rate  0.026  0.024  0.032  0.035  0.037  0.021  -0.008  -0.009  0.007  0.014  0.021  -0.020 
   (0.015)*  (0.015)  (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Observations  7018  2347  4671  7135  2344  4791  7183  2368  4815  5475  1679  3796 
R-squared  0.7799  0.7753  0.7778  0.8924  0.8790  0.9561  0.9555  0.9500  0.9751  0.8039  0.7974  0.8336 
Group  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed  All  Developing  Developed 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix A. Construction of the Variables 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the steps taken to construct the dataset used in the 
paper. As mentioned in the text, our main source of data is Bankscope (BSC). We obtained data 
for the 1995-1999 period from the June 2001 update of BSC and data for the 2000-2002 period 
from the February 2004 update of BSC. Processing the data required two main steps, which we 
describe below. 
Avoiding duplications. For most banks, BSC reports balance sheet data at both the 
consolidated and unconsolidated levels. In order to avoid duplications, it is necessary to use only 
one of the two definitions. If BSC reported both types of statements for all banks, this could be 
easily done by simply dropping all of either the consolidated or unconsolidated statements. 
However, some banks have  only a consolidated statement, while others have only an 
unconsolidated statement, hence dropping just one category would lead to loss of information. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to automatically keep the unconsolidated statement, for instance, if 
the consolidated statement is missing because, in some cases, there are slight changes in the 
reported name of the bank across different levels of consolidation. An even more difficult 
problem is that in some cases BSC reports information for the same bank several times. This is 
especially the case at the time of mergers. An example may be helpful here. Consider the case of 
INTESA, the largest Italian banking group. INTESA was created in 1998 with the merger of 
CARIPLO and AMBROVENETO. In 1999, Banca Commerciale Italiana (COMIT) joined the 
INTESA group and in 2001 COMIT completely merged with INTESA, which took the name of 
INTESABCI.  As of 2000, BSC reports data for (i) COMIT; (ii) AMBROVENETO;  (iii) 
CARIPLO; and (iv) INTESABCI. Clearly, considering all these four banks would lead to a large 
overestimation of Italian banking assets. To address this problem, we make use of a variable 
included in BSC that ranks banks within a country and is built in order to limit duplications (the 
variable name is CTRYRANK).  In the above case, CTRYRANK takes a value of one for 
INTESABCI (recognizing that this is the largest bank in the country), 5 for CARIPLO and 12 for 
AMBROVENETO. COMIT is not ranked (CTRYRANK takes the value NR). Therefore, 
dropping the banks that are coded as  non-ranked can help prevent duplication. There are, 
however, still two problems with this strategy. First, the dataset would still include INTESABCI 
and two of its component (AMBROVENETO and CARIPLO). Second, the ranking variable 
refers to the last year, and hence if we were to drop all the banks that are not ranked, we would   46 
 
also drop COMIT for the 1995-1999 period. To address this issue, we looked at all banks coded 
as non-ranked with assets greater than the country average, and we explored their merger history. 
This led to a massive amount of recoding that helped us to include in the dataset most of the 
relevant information and avoid duplications.
38  
Coding Ownership. BSC includes an ownership variable, measuring whether a given 
bank is owned by the public sector or by foreign investors, but this variable has limited coverage 
and is only available for the current year, as BSC does not provide ownership history. Therefore, 
coding ownership history requires looking at one bank at a time. This process involves using a 
variety of approaches and resources; these include Internet searches, consulting bank websites 
and publications such as Euromoney, and telephone interviews with experts in various countries. 
As this is a particularly time-consuming and difficult endeavor, and the cost of coding all banks 
included in the dataset would have been too high, we decided to adopt some cut-off points under 
which a bank would not be coded.  
The following procedure was used to determine cut-off points. In all countries we coded 
the 10 largest banks, the same strategy as followed by La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002). If these banks represented less than 75 percent of total assets of the banking system we 
coded all banks up to 75 percent of total assets of the banking system. In Latin American and 
industrial countries, we coded the largest 20 banks. Again, if these 20 banks represented less than 
75 percent of total assets of the banking system, we coded up to 75 percent of assets of the 
banking system. If a bank was not among the top twenty or in the 75th percentile but the coding 
was obvious (for instance in the case of foreign branches) it was also coded.  
In coding ownership, we followed the same strategy as La Porta, López-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2002) and assumed that if X percent of bank A is owned by company B and that Y 
percent of company B is owned by a foreign company (alternately state owned), then we code 
bank A as being X*Y percent foreign (state) owned. At this point it should also be noted that, in 
order to code ownership, we always went back at least two steps in the ownership structure. 
                                                 
38 In the case of the example described above, we adopted the following strategy. We re-ranked (and hence included 
in the dataset) COMIT from 1995 to 1999 and de-ranked (and hence excluded from the dataset) Ambroveneto and 
CARIPLO for 2000-2002 and Intesa BCI for 1995-1999. After dropping the non-ranked bank we end up with three 
banks (COMIT, Ambroveneto and CARIPLO) operating for the 1995-1999 period and one bank (IntesaBCI) 
operating for the 2000-2002 period.   47 
 
Table A1. Description of the Variables Included in the Dataset 
 
Variables   Descriptors  Variables   Descriptors 
Year  year  n2095  Loan Loss Provisions 
country  Country Name   n2095_ta  Loan Loss Provisions over total assets 
C3  Share of assets of the 3 largest banks over total assets  n2095c  Number of banks with information on n2095 
SOB  Share of Public Assets to total Assets in the country  n2105  Profit before Tax  
FOB  Share of Foreign Assets over Total Assets   n2105_ta  Profit before Tax over total assets 
banks  Number of banks in the country per year  n2105c  Number of banks with information on n2105 
branches  Number of Branches  n2115  Net Income  
branches_ta  Number of Branches over total assets  n2115_ta  Net Income over total assets 
branchesc  Number of banks with information on branches  n2115c  Number of banks with information on n2115 
empl  Number of Employees   n2125  Total Capital Ratio 
empl_ta  Number of Employees over total assets  n2125c  Number of banks with information on n2125 
emplc  Number of banks with information on empl  n4024  Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
n2000  Loans  n4024c  Number of banks with information on n4024 
n2000_ta  Loans over total assets  n4025  Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 
n2000c  Number of banks with information on n2000  n4025c  Number of banks with information on n4025 
n2010  Total Earning Assets   n5100  Loans to Municipalities/Government  
n2010_ta  Total Earning Assets over total assets  n5100_ta 
Loans to Municipalities/Government over total 
assets 
n2010c  Number of banks with information on n2010  n5100c  Number of banks with information on n5100 
n2015  Fixed Assets  n5190  Total Customer Loans 
n2015_ta  Fixed Assets over total assets  n5190_ta  Total Customer Loans over total assets 
n2015c  Numer of banks with information on n2015  n5190c  Number of banks with information on n5190 
n2020  Non Earning Assets   n5240  Total Problem Loans 
n2020_ta  Non Earning Assets over total assets  n5240_ta  Total Problem Loans over total assets 
n2020c  Number of banks with information on n2020  n5240c  Number of banks with information on n5240 
n2025  Total Assets  n5330  Total Loans - Net  
n2025c  Number of banks with information on total assets  n5330_ta  Total Loans - Net over total assets 
n2030  Customer & Short Term Funding   n5330c  Number of banks with information on n5330 
n2030_ta  Customer & Short Term Funding over total assets  n5410  Government Securities 
n2030c  Number of banks with information on n2030  n5410_ta  Government Securities over total assets 
n2045  Loan Loss Reserves   n5410c  Number of banks with information on n5410 
n2045c  Number of banks with information on n2045  n5490  Tresury Bills 
n2055  Equity  n5490_ta  Tresury Bills over total assets 
n2055c  Number of banks with information on n2055  n5490c  Number of banks with information on n5490 
n2080  Net Interest Revenue   n5920  Deposits-Demand  
n2080_ta  Net Interest Revenue over total assets  n5920_ta  Deposits-Demand  over total assets 
n2080c  Number of banks with information on n2080  n5920c  Number of banks with information on n5920 
n2085  Other Operating Income   n5925  Deposits-Savings  
n2085_ta  Other Operating Income over total assets  n5925_ta  Deposits-Savings over total assets 
n2085c  Number of banks with information on n2085  n5925c  Number of banks with information on n5925 
n2090  Overheads  n6000  Customer Deposits  
n2090_ta  Overheads over total assets  n6000_ta  Customer Deposits over total assets 
n2090c  Number of banks with information on n2090  n6000c  Number of banks with information on n6000 
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Table A2. Region-Specific Regressions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE 
Public   -0.479  -4.493  -0.559  -3.288  -1.214  -6.447  0.089  -1.976  -0.211  -6.604 
 
(0.170)**
*  (3.754)  (0.307)*  (2.324) 
(0.253)*
**  (1.901)***  (0.107)  (1.176)* 
(0.072)**
*  (1.270)*** 
Foreign   0.271  1.235  0.594  5.280  -0.226  -0.905  0.084  0.789  0.027  -4.155 
  (0.149)*  (1.795) 
(0.261)*
*  (2.186)**  (0.127)*  (1.135)  (0.085)  (1.009)  (0.163)  (2.454)* 
Non Int 
Inc/TA  -0.130  -1.920  -0.020  -0.351  -0.013  -0.106  0.099  0.062  0.151  2.361 
  (0.148)  (1.284)  (0.069)  (0.521)  (0.044)  (0.272)  (0.079)  (0.706) 
(0.058)**
*  (0.893)*** 
Dda 
Dep/TDep  0.005  0.026  0.018  0.066  0.011  0.128  0.002  0.000  -0.003  -0.163 
  (0.003)  (0.041) 
(0.006)*
**  (0.040)  (0.007)*  (0.050)***  (0.004)  (0.037)  (0.005)  (0.070)** 
Lag TA (ln)  0.152  2.015  0.021  0.536  0.129  2.112  -0.191  1.132  -0.123  -0.212 
  (0.070)** 
(0.893)*
*  (0.144)  (1.130)  (0.086)  (0.707)*** 
(0.040)*
**  (0.434)*** 
(0.040)**
*  (0.680) 
Lag Share  -1.756  -10.642  -1.770  -3.893  1.187  3.487  1.320  3.241  0.148  3.099 
  (0.686)**  (9.260)  (1.499)  (9.001)  (0.968)  (7.850) 
(0.298)*
**  (3.291)  (0.540)  (8.096) 
Observations  912  913  737  726  1958  1912  732  723  702  696 
R-squared  0.3693  0.3301  0.3331  0.4173  0.4166  0.4819  0.5356  0.4292  0.6059  0.5601 
Group 
East Asia &  
Pacific 
East Europe &  
Central Asia  Latin America 
Middle East &  
North Africa  South Asia 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share.     
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 